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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. Whether the administrative order issued by a state agency
under a state solid waste act was a "diligent prosecution" sufficient to bar a citizen suit under the Clean Water Act (CWA) where
the state act did not provide for citizen participation, did not address water pollution and did not authorize the state agency to
assess penalties?
II. Whether mining overburden that remains in a creek bed and
has not been remedied is a continuing violation of the CWA sufficient to grant a court jurisdiction over a citizen suit?
III. Whether a non-profit organization is in "privity" with a state
enforcement agency sufficient to be barred from filing a citizen
suit where they have different enforcement objectives and seek to
enforce against different violations?
IV. Whether an "order" issued by a state enforcement agency is
sufficient to render a citizen suit moot?
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OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the United States District Court for the District of Rocky Mountain is unpublished and appears in the record
on appeal reproduced in Appendix A.
RELEVANT STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
The relevant Constitutional provision is the Due Process
Clause, U.S. Const. amend. XIV, which is reproduced in Appendix
B. The relevant statutes are the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act, or the Clean Water Act § 101 et seq., 33 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq.,
pertinent provisions of which are provided in Appendix C. The
relevant federal rules are provided in Appendix D. The relevant
regulations are 33 C.F.R. §323.2, and §328.3(a)(1) the text of
which is provided in Appendix E.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE**
Statement of the Facts
Magma Mining Company (MMC) operated an open pit opal
mine on the slope of Magic Mountain intermittently between January 1980 and January 1998. (R. 4). Friends of Lustra (FOL) is a
not-for-profit organization created for the protection of the interests of Lustra Creek located in the State of Rocky Mountain. (R.
3). It is uncontested that MMC placed the overburden removed
from their open pit opal mine at the base of the slope of Magic
Mountain. (R. 4). Lustra Creek, which flows into Roaring River,
which flows into Columbia River, and is a navigable water, has
been covered by overburden for approximately a half a mile. (R. 4).
As a result, Lustra Creek flows underground for half a mile beneath the overburden. (R. 4).
MMC plans a fourth phase of mining, for which it will be necessary to remove more overburden. (R. 4). MMC has yet to decide
what to do with the overburden that they remove in the future,
and have not secured landfill space for disposal. (R. 4). Placing
the overburden in the Creek bed is the easiest and cheapest
means of disposal. (R. 4).
The State of Rocky Mountain Department of Environmental
and Natural Resources (RMDENR) issued a notice of violation
** Editors Note: References to the Record may be found reprinted in Appendix A
of the Yale Law School Brief. The original page number of the Record has been
indicated within Appendix A of the Yale Brief by bracketed page numbers, e.g. [. n].

9

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19

(NOV) against MMC for violating the Rocky Mountain Solid
Waste Act (RMSWA) by disposing of waste without a proper permit. (R. 4). RMDENR then issued a Consent Order without any
notice to the public or a public hearing in August of 1994. (R. 4).
MMC continued to place overburden in the Creek bed until January of 1998. (R. 4).
Procedural History
FOL filed suit against MMC under the citizen suit provision
of the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. § 1365. (R. 3). The suit
alleged violations of 33 U.S.C. §§1311, 1342, and 1344. (R. 1). The
District Court for the District of Rocky Mountain granted the
State of Rocky Mountain permissive intervention in the action.
(R. 3).
MMC moved for summary judgment, which the court subsequently granted. FOL and Rocky Mountain have appealed this
decision, seeking an injunction preventing MMC from discharging
additional pollutants into Lustra Creek and requiring appellee to
remove the pollutants it has discharged into the Creek thus far.
(R. 3). The appellants further seek the assessment of civil penalties of $25,000 per day for each day the fill remains in the Creek.

(R. 3).
Standard of Review
FOL, on appeal, seeks review of the district court's dismissal
of their original action. The district court dismissed the action on
summary judgment, thus the court of appeal must apply the de
novo standard of review. Andrews v. Ohio, 104 F.3d 803, 806 ( 6 th
Cir. 1997).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The State of Rocky Mountain's action did not meet the requirements of "diligent prosecution" in order to preclude FOL
from filing a citizen suit. The RMSWA enforcement action provision giving the state enforcement authority is not comparable to
§1319(g) of the CWA. The state statute does not address water
pollution, it does not provide for proper notice and comment, and
it does not assess penalties. Not only is the statutory provision
insufficiently comparable, the state did not diligently prosecute
MMC under that statute. Furthermore, RMDENR did not diligently prosecute where the actions have been ongoing for 18
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol19/iss1/10
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years, the enforcement actions taken to date have been wholly unsuccessful, and have not deterred MMC from further actions.
FOL is not precluded from bringing a citizen suit action because the violations are continuing. There were sufficient grounds
to grant the court jurisdiction because FOL made good a faith allegation of a continuing violation. Additionally, MMC's violation
was continuing and, alternatively, MMC was likely to violate the
CWA again by disposing of more overburden into Lustra Creek.
The doctrine of res judicata does not bar FOL's suit because
FOL and RMDENR are not in privity. Additionally, a consent decree does not invoke the application of the res judicata doctrine
since it is not a final judgment rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction. A consent decree does not provide for the proper adversarial proceedings that are required by procedural due process
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. Furthermore,
res judicata does not apply where FOL did not receive proper notice of the Consent Order.
FOL's case is not moot because MMC's violations are continuing. MMC will most likely violate the CWA again and the disposal
period will not be long enough to fully litigate and cease the detrimental harm to Lustra Creek and the bodies of water it flows into.
In addition, if this Court upholds the lower court's decision that
the MMC's cessation was voluntary, MMC will not be able to overcome the heightened standard required, as it is reasonably certain
that their previous violations will recur. Assuming arguendo that
the injunctive relief is moot, the civil penalties sought are not, because MMC participated in wholly past violations.
ARGUMENT
I.

FOL'S ACTION WAS NOT "DILIGENTLY
PROSECUTED," BECAUSE THE STATE
STATUTORY PROVISION APPLIED WAS NOT
SUFFICIENTLY COMPARABLE.

The State of Rocky Mountain brought an enforcement action
against Magma Mining Co. (MMC) for its disposal of mining overburden in Lustra Creek. (R. 4). The district court of Rocky Mountain precluded a subsequent Clean Water Act citizen suit because
the state had diligently prosecuted MMC under the appropriate
state administrative procedures. (R. 4). However, the State of
Rocky Mountain's action did not meet the requirements of "dili11
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gent prosecution" in order to preclude FOL from filing a citizen
suit.
The citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act was promulgated in 1972. S. REP. No. 92-414 (1972). The provision's purpose
was to "enable private parties to assist in enforcement efforts
where Federal and State authorities appear unwilling to act."
(emphasis added). North and South Rivers Watershed Assoc. v.
Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552, 555 (1st Cir. 1991). In 1987, citizens seized this opportunity with unbridled enthusiasm. As a result, Congress enacted legislation to create safeguarding
provisions to prevent unreasonable burdens on the courts and industry. The legislation promulgated was ambiguous, stating that
once an action has been taken by a State, a citizen suit may be
precluded, as long as one of three exceptions has been met: 1) the
Administrator or Secretary of the USEPA is currently "diligently
prosecuting" an action under this subsection; 2) a State is currently "diligently prosecuting" an action under the state law that
is "comparable" to this subsection; or 3) there has been a final order issued either by the USEPA or the State authority and a penalty has been assessed, provided the state law is comparable. 33
U.S.C. §1319(g)(6).
The RMSWA enforcement action provision cannot preclude a
citizen suit by FOL because the RMSWA provision giving the state
enforcement authority is not comparable to §1319(g) of the CWA.
The state statute does not address water pollution, it does not provide for proper notice and comment, and it does not assess penalties. Not only is the statutory provision insufficiently comparable,
the state did not diligently prosecute MMC under that statute.
A.

The RMSWA is not sufficiently "comparable" to the
applicable provisions of the Federal Clean Water
Act to preclude FOL's Citizen Suit.

Citizen suits are precluded where the "State has commenced
and is diligently prosecuting an action under a State law comparable to this subsection." 33 U.S.C. §1319(g)(6). The first step in determining whether the state has brought an action that can
properly preclude a citizen's right, is to determine if the state law
is "comparable" to the CWA. When comparing the state statute to
the CWA, the particular provision is examined, not the statutory
scheme as a whole. See Hoy v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 861 F. Supp.
881 (N.D. Cal. 1994). In the case at hand, we would determine
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol19/iss1/10
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whether the enforcement provision of the RMSWA is similar to the
enforcement provision of the CWA.
There are several requirements that must be met in order for
a state law to be considered comparable within the context of
§1319(g) of the CWA. First, the courts have overwhelmingly held
that there must have been an adequate opportunity for public participation.
Second, the RMSWA statutory provision that
RMDENR acted under is not "comparable" because it does not authorize RMDENR to assess penalties, and in the alternative, if
§1319(g) does bar the assessment of penalties, it does not bar the
assessment of injunctive relief. Finally, the state law must be a
law concerning water protection and water pollution abatement.
The statute that MMC is regulated under is the RMSWA, which is
a solid waste act and not a water pollution control act.
(1)

The RMSWA is not "comparable" because citizens
were not provided proper notice and
opportunity for comment.

In promulgating the CWA, Congress included provisions for
the "rights of interested persons." Section 1319(g)(4) provides for
1) "public notice" 2) "notice of any hearing" and "reasonable opportunity to be heard," and 3) the right to petition for hearing if one is
not held. In addition, according to § 1319(g)(8), the administrator
must provide notice and reasons for denial of hearing and commentators have the right to contest the penalty assessment. Furthermore, private citizens must be able to intervene on state
actions as a matter of right. §1365(b)(1)(B).
It is uncontested that RMDENR did not provide public notice
of the notice of violation, of its intent to issue the Consent Order,
or of the issuance of the order. (R. 4). Furthermore, the RMSWA
provided no provision for public notice or intervention regarding
administrative enforcement actions. (R. 5).
The courts have upheld this reasoning on numerous occasions
and in several jurisdictions. See U.S. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc.,
965 F. Supp. 769 (E.D. Va. 1997) (where the recipient of a special
order could waive formal hearing, the public was denied the opportunity for hearing before the issuance of the special order);
Public Interest Group of New Jersey v. GAF Corp., 770 F. Supp.
943 (D.N.J. 1991); National Resource Defense Council v. Vygen,
803 F. Supp. 97 (N.D. Ohio 1992) (the state law was not comparable because the law did not include mandatory public participation safeguards); Arkansas Wildlife Federation v. ICI Americas,
13
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Inc., 29 F.3d 376, 381 ( 8 th Cir. 1994) (a statute is comparable if it
"provides interested citizens a meaningful opportunity to participate in significant stages of the decision-making process,"). Even
where the courts have read the citizen suit preclusion broadly,
they have stated that "so long as the provisions of the State Act
adequately safeguard the substantive interests of the citizens,"
then the act is comparable. North and South Rivers Watershed Association, Inc., v. Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d at 556 & n.7.
Lack of notice provisions is enough to render the RMSWA incomparable to federal law. See L.E.A.D. v. Exide, 1999 WL
124473 (E.D. Pa. 1999). The statute being compared to the CWA
must not only have provisions for public notice and opportunity
for hearing, but the facts of the case must further "demonstrate
that the state denied an interested party a meaningful opportunity to participate in the administrative enforcement process."
L.E.A.D. 1999 WL 124473 at *31 (citingArkansas Wildlife 29 F.3d
at 382). RMDENR provided no means of notice or opportunity for
comment. (R. 5). This fact alone creates the presumption that the
RMSWA is not comparable and therefore would create a gross injustice if it were to preclude concerned citizens from filing a civil
suit under § 1365.
(2)

The statutory provision that RMDENR acted
under is not "comparable" because it did not
authorize RMDENR to assess penalties and,
in the alternative, it does not bar the
assessment of injunctive relief.

The court below noted that under the state act, RMDENR
may issue administrative orders or, alternatively, file a civil action in state court seeking injunctive relief or civil penalties. (R.
5). The statute, however, does not provide for administrative penalties. (R. 5). Payment made in response to a court proceeding (a
civil penalty) does not meet the scrutiny of an administrative penalty that will assure that the purposes of the sanction have been
met (deterrence, disgorging benefit, etc.). See Citizens for a Better
Environment-Californiav. Union Oil Company of California, 83
F.3d 1111 ( 9 th Cir. 1996).
When determining the meaning of a statute, the first and
most obvious place to look is the statute itself. See Consumer
ProductSafety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 447 U.S. 102 (1980).
Under strict interpretation, §1319(g)(6)(A)(iii) requires that without payment of a "penalty" under comparable state law, the citihttps://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol19/iss1/10
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zen suit cannot be precluded. UNOCAL, 83 F.3d at 1115. An
administrative penalty must be assessed, and a court assessed
civil penalty or settlement is not sufficient to meet this requirement. See U.S. v. Smithfield, 965 F. Supp. at 792 (E.D. Va. 1997);
UNOCAL, 83 F.3d at 1118, Friendsof Sante Fe v. LAC Minerals,
892 F.Supp.1333 (D.N.M. 1995).
Furthermore, one should give preference to the language of
the statute, and less discretion to congressional intent. Washington Public Interest Research Group v. Pendleton Woolen Mills, 11
F.3d 883, 886 ( 9 th Cir. 1993) ("General arguments about congressional intent.. .cannot persuade us to abandon the clear language
that Congress used when it drafted the statute. The most persuasive evidence of . .[congressional] intent is the words selected by
Congress, not a court's sense of the general role of citizen suits in
the enforcement of the Act"). The courts have frequently admonished the heavy reliance on policy reasons, which has essentially
read policy into statutory language that is not apparent. LAC
Minerals, 892 F. Supp. at 1346. Thus, Gwaltney is inapposite.
The Supreme Court in Gwaltney, did not look to literal translation
of the statute, but added loaded policy concerns which seemed to
influence their entire interpretation. The Court's decision read,
"Respondents' interpretation of the scope of the citizen suit would
change the nature of the citizens' role from interstitial to potentially intrusive. We cannot agree that Congress intended such a
result." Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 61.
A state law is only comparable to §1319(g) if it authorizes the
state to assess administrativepenalties for violations of the CWA
or of a permit. U.S. v. Smithfield 965 F. Supp. at 792. RMSWA
authorizes civil penalties, not administrative penalties. The enforcement agency cannot assess the penalties, it can only refer the
problem to civil court, which may or may not assess penalties. Administrative penalties are distinguishable from civil penalties,
and a citizen suit cannot be barred when the enforcement agency
has not instituted an administrative penalty action. See Old
Timer v. Blackhawk-Central City Sanitation District, 51 F. Supp.
2d 1109 (D. Colo. 1999); Washington Public Interest Research
Group (WashPIRG) v. Pendleton Woolen Mills, 11 F.2d 883 ( 9 th
Cir. 1993).
However, assuming arguendo this Court feels that a citizen
suit seeking penalties is precluded, then alternatively, FOL
should retain their right to bring a citizen suit seeking injunction.
The clear language of the citizen suit preclusion act precludes only
15
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citizen suits seeking civil penalties, not injunctions. Coalition for
a Livable West Side, Inc. v. New York City Dep't of Envtl Protection, 830 F. Supp. 194, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), (citing New York
Coastal Fishermen's Ass'n v. New York City Dep't of Sanitation,
772 F. Supp. 162, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)). "[S]parse but relevant legislative history generally supports this conclusion. The Conference Committee Report states that, . . . 'This limitation would not
apply to (1) an action seeking relief other than civil penalties (e.g.
an injunction or declaratory judgment). . ."' Coalitionfor a Livable
West Side, 803 F. Supp. at 196 & n.1. (citing H.R. CoNF. REP. No.
99-1004, at 133 (1986). §309(g)(6)(A); See also United States v.
Smithfield Foods, 965 F. Supp. 769.
(3)

The statutory provision that RMDENR acted
under is not "comparable" as required by
§ 1319(g)(6) because it does not address water
pollution.

The court below stated that "the fact that the RMSWA is not
primarily a water pollution statute is of no account, since one of its
purposes is to protect water quality, EPA has approved
RMDENR's water pollution program pursuant to CWA § 402(c),
and the permitting and enforcement programs under the Rocky
Mountain Clean Water Act and the RMSWA both require coordinated implementation." SierraClub v. Colorado Refining Co., 852
F. Supp. 1476, 1481-83 (D. Colo. 1994). This suit was originally
filed under the RMSWA, the state statute created to prevent harm
created by the disposal of solid wastes. The purpose of the RMSWA and the CWA are fundamentally different.
B.

RMDENR's enforcement action should not be given
deference where their action did not "diligently
prosecute" MMC.

When a state has been ineffective in taking action against a
violator, interested citizens should not be precluded from bringing
a civil suit to force action on the violator or by the state.
"'Inaction by the state or federal government is not a justification for dismissing a citizen suit; instead, it is the principal justification for allowing such a suit to go forward.'"
Friendsof the Earth v. Laidlaw at 495 (quoting amicus brief of the
Department of Justice).
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol19/iss1/10
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Regardless of whether a state has instituted an action under
a state law that is comparable the CWA, the action must still meet
a certain level of diligence. See ConnecticutFund for the Environment v. Contract Plating Co, Inc., 631 F. Supp.1291 (D. Conn.
1986). See also S. REP. No. 1196, at 37 (1970) (Legislative history
of adding citizen suit provisions to the Clean Air Act). If this level
of diligence is not met, then the court must consider the citizen
suit. Id. From the proceedings below, it is evident that the State
of Rocky Mountain has not met this level of diligence.
The court must presume diligence absent a showing of persuasive evidence that they have engaged in a pattern of conduct
that could be considered "dilatory, collusive, or otherwise in bad
faith." Connecticut Fund 631 F. Supp. at 1293. Friends of the
Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Services, 890 F. Supp. 470, 486-487
(D.S.C. 1995). However, this discretion can be overcome where
the facts show that the agency has not held up its end of the bargain. Connecticut Fund 631 F. Supp. at 1294. Cf.Arkansas Wildlife, 842 F. Supp. 1140, 1149 (E.D. Ark. 1993) (great deference
should be given to the agency's proceeding, however, this is distinguishable because the violator made continuing efforts to remedy
the violation).
Several aspects of an agency's action should be reviewed to
determine whether the agency's action was diligent or not. First,
the length of time that has elapsed between the agency's first enforcement action and the filing of the citizen suit is significant if
the action has not resulted in significant remedy. New York
Coastal Fishermen'sAss'n v. New York City Dep't of Sanitation,
772 F. Supp. at 168. Second, the court should look to whether
there has been successful enforcement of the Consent Order, and
whether there has been substantial relief. Id.; Laidlaw 890 F.
Supp. at 490; Gardeski v. Colonial Sand & Stone Co., 501 F. Supp.
at 1159, 1164 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). Finally, the remedy or penalty assessed should be sufficient to deter the violator and vitiate any
economic benefit that the company may have received. Laidlaw,
890 F. Supp. at 491.
The first agency action taken by RMDENR was in 1993 when
it issued a Notice of Violation (NOV) against MMC for disposing of
the overburden in Lustra without a permit. (R. 4). Seven years
later, there has been no significant remedy to the area. (R. 5).
MMC's attempts at remediation have failed miserably. (R. 4). The
vegetation planted has not propagated significantly, in direct violation of the Consent Order, which required MMC to "nurture the
17
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vegetation so it was indistinguishable from vegetation on adjacent
areas within three years." (R. 4). The concentration of suspended
solids below the landfill is greater than above the landfill. (R. 4).
The record indicates that this is a substantial increase from the
previous years. (R. 4 - 5). This presence of suspended solids in
the river threatens to affect the rivers downstream as well. (R. 4).
The lack of action and failure to reach an adequate remedy over
the past seven years is not diligent prosecution. New York Coastal
Fishermen'sAss'n, 772 F. Supp. at 168.
Furthermore, RMDENR has taken no subsequent action to
require MMC to meet the requirements of the Consent Order. (R.
4-5). The action that MMC did take in compliance with the Consent Order has not been successful and has provided no relief. (R.
4). Thus, the state did not diligently prosecute MMC. Laidlaw,
890 F. Supp. at 490 ("the lack of substantial relief in a settlement
is properly considered by the court in determining whether the
state action was diligently prosecuted."); See Gardeski v. Colonial
Sand and Stone Co., Inc., 501 F. Supp. at 1166 ("However, diligent
these settlement efforts may have been, they were unsuccessful
and cannot be equated with the prosecution of an enforcement
action.").
The fact that MMC has not paid a penalty is significant in
determining if the prosecution by the state was diligent. Laidlaw,
890 F. Supp. at 491 (held that the prosecution against Laidlaw
that imposed $100,000 was not enough to recover the economic
benefit that Laidlaw received from their violation in order to serve
as a successful deterrent). RMDENR's consent order required
only that MMC plant native vegetation over the waste. (R. 4). The
cost of the landscaping will not be sufficient to act as a deterrent.
The cost of obtaining a permit and proper disposal of the overburden may be significantly more expensive and the penalties required to be assessed will have more of a deterrent effect.
As a final note, RMDENR's lack of diligent prosecution is
even more egregious because the lack of notice to the plaintiffs
curtailed their opportunity to intervene. This should lead to a
heightened scrutiny of the actions taken by RMDENR and MMC.
Laidlaw, 890 F. Supp. at 490.
It is evident that the court below abused its discretion by disregarding the following facts: 1) the length of time these actions
have been ongoing; 2) the lack of success of the enforcement proceedings to date; and 3) the lack of deterrent effect on MMC.
Thus, it is respectfully suggested that the lower court's summary
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol19/iss1/10
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judgment should be overruled and remanded for further fact finding, since the court abused its discretion.
II. THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN DENYING
JURISDICTION OVER FOL'S CLAIM WHERE
MMC'S VIOLATION WAS CONTINUING AS
WELL AS SUBSTANTIALLY LIKELY TO
RECUR IN TE FUTURE.
The court below held that FOL had no subject matter jurisdiction to bring suit under the CWA citizen suit provision because the
violation was not continuing. This was an error on two separate
grounds. First, there were sufficient grounds to grant the court
jurisdiction because FOL made a good faith allegation of a continuing violation. Second, MMC's violation was continuing and, alternatively, MMC was likely to violate the CWA again by
disposing of more overburden into Lustra Creek.
The lower court primarily relied on the decision in Gwaltney
of Smithfield, Inc. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation,Inc. 484 U.S.
49, 64 (1987), where the Supreme Court concluded that 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(a) confers jurisdiction over citizen suits when a plaintiff
makes a good faith allegation of continuous or intermittent violations. Unfortunately, the Rocky Mountain District Court decided
whether the violation was actually continuing, and disregarded
the fact that the jurisdictional question was based solely on
whether there was a good faith allegation. (R. 7-8). In fact, the
district court in quoting Gwaltney emphasized the words "to be in"
rather than "alleged" in the phrase "alleged to be in violation."
Gwaltney pointed out that citizen-plaintiffs are not required to
prove their allegations of ongoing noncompliance before jurisdiction attaches under the citizen suit provision. Gwaltney, 484 U.S.
at 64. "The statute does not require that a defendant 'be in violation' of the Act at the commencement of suit; rather, the statute
requires that a defendant be 'alleged to be in violation."' Id. See
also Ohio Public Interest Research Group v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 635, 640, (S.D. Ohio 1996). ("This
holding reflects the sensitivity to the fact that proving on-going
violations of environmental standards at the pleading stage, without the benefit of discovery, would often be an insurmountable obstacle to the initiation of a citizen suit.").
For these reasons, this court has jurisdiction to decide
whether the violation meets one or both of the two prong test certified in Gwaltney: that it is either ongoing, or likely to recur.
19
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Gwaltney of Smithfield, Inc. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation,Inc,
890 F.2d 690, 693 (4 th Cir. 1989), on remand from, Gwaltney, 484
U.S. 49. MMC's violations are ongoing because the overburden remains without being remedied and potentially causes increased
sedimentation in the rivers down stream. MMC has demonstrated their tendency to disregard state authority by continuing
to dispose of overburden into Lustra Creek after the issuance of
the Notice of Violation. (R. 9). Additionally, MMC has dumped
overburden into Lustra Creek intermittently for eight years, and
still has a phase of mining to complete, creating a sufficient allegation that the dumping has not ceased and in fact will occur
again. (R. 5).
A.

The presence of mining overburden in Lustra Creek
is a continuing violation of 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1342
and 1344.

MMC deposited waste overburden into Lustra Creek. The
overburden remains in the Creek bed and any attempts at
remediation have been wholly unsuccessful. These actions taken
by MMC constitute a violation of the CWA that continues as long
as the overburden remains in the Creek. (R. 4). MMC cannot be
allowed to escape responsibility solely because they were not
"caught in the act" of depositing the overburden. Such a conclusion is in direct contradiction to the clear language and purpose of
the CWA as well as other federal environmental statutes. In fact,
the CWA opens with the statement that, "The objective of this
chapter [CWA] is to restore and maintain the chemical, physical,
and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." 33 U.S.C. § 1251.
The fundamental purpose of the CWA is to prohibit the discharge of pollutants without a permit. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311,
1342, and 1344. To date, MMC has yet to obtain a CWA permit,
however, MMC deposited large amounts of mining overburden
into a navigable water, to the point of filling the entire creek bed
to dry land. (R. 4). MMC violated the CWA and they have virtually avoided any retribution.
(1)

MMC has violated, and continues to violate the
CWA by discharging without a § 1342 permit
and allowing the discharge to remain in the
Creek bed.

Rocky Mountain is federally approved under the § 1342 permitting program. (R. 7). Section 1342 of the CWA regulates
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol19/iss1/10
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"point-source" pollution into the "navigable waters" of the United
States. 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (12). ("The discharge of a pollutant is
any addition of any pollutant [as broadly defined under 33 U.S.C.
§1362(6)] to navigable waters from any point source."). The overburden, once removed from the mine, is dumped, presumably from
dump trucks, directly into the riverbed. As such, the dump truck
acts as a "point-source," and Lustra Creek is the "navigablewater." As long as the overburden remains in the riverbed, it is
continually releasing sediment that is carried downstream into
the tributaries of Roaring and Columbia Rivers. Therefore, the
sediment remaining in the riverbed acts as the "point-source"
whose continual outflow is polluting the "navigable waters" of
Lustra, Roaring and Columbia. "... [A] discharge of pollutants is
ongoing if the pollutants continue to reach navigable waters, even
if the discharger is no longer adding pollutants to the point source
itself." Umatilla Waterquality Protective Ass'n v. Smith Frozen
Foods, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1312, 1322 (D. Or. 1997) (An abandoned
brine pit was discharging residues through groundwater to surface waters, and the discharge constituted an "ongoing violation"
of the CWA. Based on these facts, the court held that jurisdiction
under Gwaltney was proper). See also Werlein v. United States,
746 F. Supp. 887, 896-97 (D. Minn. 1990), class cert. vacated 793
F. Supp. 898 (D. Minn. 1992) (Toxic waste that migrates to a waterway over time is an ongoing pollution of that waterway for
CWA purposes, even though all of the contaminants were dumped
years before).
The continuing presence of the overburden without a permit
is a continuing violation as well. See Molokai Chamber of Commerce v. Kukui (Molokai), Inc., 891 F. Supp. 1389 (D. Haw. 1995)
(operating without a NPDES permit was a present, not a past violation). "[A] discharger operating without a permit 'remains in a
continuing state of violation until it either obtains a permit or no
longer meets the definition of a point source."' Id. at 1400 (citing
Carr v. Alta Verde Industries, Inc., 931 F.2d 1055, 1062 (5 th
Cir.1991)).1
1. See also Sierra Club v. Simkins, 847 F.2d 1109, cert. Denied, 491 U.S. 904,

(The lack of monitoring reports were held to be an "ongoing violation"); Patterson
Farm Inc. v. City of Britton, South Dakota, 22 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (D.S.D. 1998). (The
court found the "plaintiff alleged in good faith continuous violations of the CWA by the
City, including the failure to abide by the inspection and record keeping provisions of
the NPDES permits."); Ohio Public Interest Research Group v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 635, 640 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (Court found a continuing
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MMC's failure to get a permit is a procedural violation of
§ 1342 of the CWA and its dumping of overburden is a substantive
violation of 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) that is continuous in nature. Furthermore, the integrity of the self-reporting system of regulation
is at stake if CWA violators, without a permit, are allowed to undermine the system by escaping liability under a court's narrow
interpretation of Gwaltney.
(2)

In the alternative, MMC has also violated the
CWA by filling wetlands without a § 404 permit
and allowing the fill material to remain.

MMC is continually violating the CWA by "discharging" "fill
material" into a "water of the United States" without a §404 permit. Section 404 of the CWA regulates "the discharge of dredge
and fill materials into navigable waters." 33 U.S.C. § 1344. Code
of Federal Regulation § 323.2(e) defines a "fill material" as "any
material used for the primary purpose of replacing an aquatic
area with dry land or of changing the bottom elevation of a
waterbody." 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(e). The definition specifically excludes any pollutant discharged into the water "primarily to dispose of waste, as that activity is regulated under section 402 of the
Clean Water Act." 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(e). MMC's disposal has filled
the creek bed. (R. 4). The filled Creek bed is no longer being
treated by the state of Rock Mountain as a water body. Their proposed remedy is to plant the area with vegetation that is native to
the surrounding area. (R.4). So the "fill" added by MMC has replaced an aquatic area with dry land, subjecting MMC's activities
to §404 of the CWA.
Section 323.2(f) defines "discharge" as "addition of fill material into the waters of the United States." 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(f).
The term "waters of the United States" is defined under 33 C.F.R.
328.3(a)(1) as "all waters which are currently used, or were used
in the past, or may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign
commerce," 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(1). After adducing that the overburden is a fill material, it is clear that MMC's addition of these
materials is in violation of § 404 permits.
MMC's violation of §404 is continuing as long as the illegally
dumped material remains, or is not remedied. See Informed Citizens United, Inc. v. USX Corp., 365 F. Supp. 2d 375 (S.D. Tex
violation and a likelihood of continuance because defendant did not implement adequate treatment measures).
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1999) (Court noted that several courts have found Gwaltney inapplicable under a § 404 violation), citing Sasser v. EPA, 990 F.2d
127, 129 ( 4 t h Cir. 1993), United States v. Reaves, 923 F. Supp.
1530, 1534 (M.D. Fla. 1996), North Carolina Wildlife Fed'n v.
Woodberry, No. 87-584-Civ-5 1989 WL 106517 (E.D.N.C. 1989);
United States v. Tull, 615 F. Supp. 610, (E.D. Va. 1983), affd, 769
F.2d 182 (4 th Cir.1985), rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 412
(1987).
Sound policy supports allowing jurisdiction because "if citizen-suits were barred merely because any illegal ditching and
drainage of a wetland tract was completed before it might reasonably be discovered, violators would have a powerful incentive to
conceal their activities from public and private scrutiny-which
would lead to serious problems in public and private enforcement
of the CWA." Informed Citizens, 365 F. Supp. 2d 375, (citing,
Woodberry, 1989 WL 106517) (Held discharge of fill material is
continuing violation is reasonable "because it is not the physical
act of discharging dredged wastes itself that leads to the injury
giving rise to citizen standing, but the consequences of the discharge in terms of lasting environment degradation.").
The continued presence of fill material in Lustra Creek and
its migration down stream is a continuing violation under § 404 of
the CWA. The "forward looking interests" as seen in Gwaltney
seems to overlook the present interest in preventing future dumping without a 404 or 402 permit. Additionally, potential citizen
suits will serve as a deterrent to those contemplating violations.
B. A reasonable trier of fact could find a significant
likelihood of a recurrence of intermittent or
sporadic violations of 33 U.S.C. § 1311(A) and 33
U.S.C. § 1342 by MMC.
If the Court finds that MMCs disposal of the overburden into
Lustra Creek is not a "continuing violation" per se, the facts adduced by the trial court indicate that there is a substantial likelihood, sufficient for a good faith allegation, that MMC may violate
the CWA in the future. The district court itself stated that MMC
placed overburden in the Creek "intermittently between January
1980 and January 1998." (emphasis added) (R. 4). Furthermore,
there is a fourth phase of mining planned which will require MMC
to remove more overburden, and the cheapest means of disposal is
into the Creek bed. (R. 4).
23
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Intermittent or sporadic violations which are likely to occur in
the future are sufficient allegations to grant jurisdiction under the
CWA. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, LTD., 890 F.2d 690 (4 th Cir. 1989) (there was a good faith
allegation that future violations were likely to occur and therefore
found there was evidence of ongoing violations).
The test to determine if the violations are ongoing that were
certified to the district court by the Supreme Court states:
"(1) by proving violations that continue on or after the date the
complaint is filed;
(2) or by adducing evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact
could find a continuing likelihood of a recurrence in intermittent
or sporadic violations. Intermittent or sporadic violations do not
cease to be ongoing until the date when there is no real likelihood of repetition .... The district court may wish to consider
whether remedial actions were taken to cure violations, the ex
ante probability that such remedial measures would be effective, and any other evidence presented during the proceedings
that bears on whether the risk of defendant's continued violation had been completely eradicated when citizen-plaintiffs
filed suit. 844 F.2d at 171-72." (emphasis added).
Id. at 693.
The plaintiffs burden of proof in the Gwaltney test is not
stringent. Concerned Area Residents for the Environment v.
Southview Farm, 834 F. Supp. 1410, 1416 (W.D.N.Y 1993). On
the other hand, the defendant's burden "is a heavy one," of proving
that it is "absolutely clear" that the discharges will not happen
again. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 66. See Connecticut Coastal Fishermen's Ass'n v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., 989 F.2d 1305 (2d Cir.
1993). MMC has not made it clear that this final phase of mining
will not result in further deposits of overburden into Lustra
Creek.
It is for this reason that the holding in the case cited by the
district court, Connecticut Coastal, 989 F.2d 1305 is distinctly
different. (R. 7). In Connecticut Coastal, the gun club made a "final irrevocable decision" never to reopen the gun club to trap and
skeet shooting at any time in the future, and they offered support
by showing they dismantled and threw away the skeet houses in
1986. Furthermore, the state Department of Environmental Protection had already issued stringent orders in 1986 to deal with
this issue, including ordering Remington to cease discharges of
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol19/iss1/10
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lead shot or get a permit. Id. at 1309. Plaintiffs did not bring suit
until April 1987. The court stated "no fair-minded juror could find
that there was a likelihood in April 1987 that Remington would
discharge lead shot in the future." Id. at 1312.
RMDENR did not issue stringent administrative orders to demand cessation of any future harm and MMC admits that there is
a plan for a fourth stage of overburden dumping within the next
year. Thus, there is no "final irrevocable decision" to cease future
activities as seen in Connecticut Coastal nor is there any evidence
that they are closing down the work site.
The Connecticut Coastal case is distinct for several other important reasons. First, our judge states that RCRA and CWA decisions are "inapposite" in that RCRA "statutory scheme is clearly
aimed, at least in part, at waste that have been disposed of in the
past but pose a present danger, RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B) and 7003."
This is in direct conflict with Connecticut Coastal, where the court
cites Gwaltney stating,
"The Supreme Court acknowledged that the language in the citizen suit provisions of the CWA and § 7002(a)(1)(A) of RCRA is
identical, yielding the same requirement that plaintiff allege an
ongoing or intermittent violation of the relevant statute."
Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 57 & n.2; see Ascon Properties,Inc. v. Mobil
Oil Co., 866 F.2d. 1149 (9' Cir. 1989) (applying requirement of
ongoing or intermittent violation to citizen suit brought under
§ 7002(a)(1)(A)).
Furthermore, the district court erred where they compared
FOL's citizen suit to the "imminent and substantial endangerment" provision of RCRA, RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B), and not the
RCRA provision under § 7002(a)(1)(A) which is virtually identical
to the CWA citizen suit provision. RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(A) provides
for citizen suits against persons who are "alleged to be in violation
of any permit, standard, regulation,.. ." which can be compared to
the citizen suit language of the CWA § 1365(a)(1) which authorizes
citizen suits against any person "alleged to be in violation." The
purpose of RCRA §7002(a)(1)(B) is for "imminent and substantial"
endangerments. See Aurora National Bank v. Tri Star Marketing,
Inc., 990 F. Supp. 1020 (N.D. Ill. 1998); see also L.E.A.D. v. Exide
Corp., 1999 WL 124473 at *9-10 (E.D. Pa.).
The application of this prong of the test is the same for a § 402
violation as it would be for a § 404 violation. As was adduced
above, there is a violation of § 404 of the CWA.
25
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III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
FOL'S SUIT WAS BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE
OF RES JUDICATA BECAUSE FOL WAS
NOT IN PRIVITY WITH RMDENR AND IT
WAS NOT A FINAL JUDGMENT ON THE
MERITS.
FOL is not barred from bringing this suit, as FOL's interests
in the instant case is not aligned with the former administrative
action as to be in privity with RMDENR. The consent administrative order entered into by RMDENR and MMC does not preclude
FOL's claim because RMDENR did not adequately represent FOL
by "virtual representation." RMDENR, in its capacity as a state
agency, had substantially different objectives in seeking to enforce
violations against MMC. FOL, by bringing an action against
MMC, sought to address issues that were separate and beyond
RMDENR's concerns. In addition, FOL and RMDENR do not
have the same legal right because they are authorized to bring an
action under and are seeking to enforce two separate and distinct
laws.
Furthermore, a consent decree does not invoke the application of the res judicata doctrine, as it is not a final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. Thus, FOL has the
right to insure RMDENR complied with proper procedure under
the Clean Water Act. Not only was FOL improperly represented
in the consent decree, but FOL was also not provided with notice
or the opportunity to voice their comments in a public hearing
prior to the issuance of the administrative consent order. Based
on the foregoing, it is evident that it would be a violation of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to bar FOL
from bringing suit against MMC, as they have a legal right to an
equitable remedy.
As this Court has jurisdiction over the instant case because
there is a federal statute involved, federal procedural rules apply.
See Aerojet-General Corp v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710, 715 ( 5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 908 (1975); Southwest Airlines Co. v. Texas
InternationalAirlines, 546 F.2d 84 (5th Cir.), cert. Denied, 434 U.S.
832 (1977).
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FOL is not precluded from bringing an action against
MMC because they were not virtually represented
by RIMDENR's administrative consent order.

Under the doctrine of res judicata, "a final judgment on the
merits bars further claims by parties or their privies based on the
same cause of action." Montana v. U.S., 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979).
Courts have recognized that a non-party may be bound by a final
judgment rendered in an earlier action if they are so aligned with
its interests as to be its "virtual representative." U.S. v. ITT
Rayonier, Inc., 627 F.2d 996, 1003 ( 9 th Cir.1980); Aerojet Gen'l
Corp v. Askew, 511 F. 2d 710, 719 (5 th Cir. 1975) cert. denied 423
U.S. 908 (1975); see also, People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. Of
Educ., 68 F.3d 172 ( 7 th Cir. 1995) (holding that the interests of the
party in the second suit must be "so parallel" to the interests of
the party in the first suit so that the first party becomes the second party's virtual representative).
FOL is a not-for-profit corporation for the protection of Lustra
Creek that flows into the Roaring River, which then flows into the
Columbia River, a navigable body of water of the United States.
(R. 4). FOL has an interest in preserving the environment and
natural resources particular to their area that may be affected by
surrounding pollutants or threats. Not only do they seek to protect the Lustra Creek, but they also have an interest in protecting
the water that flows from the Creek to other bodies of water.
RMDENR is a state agency that is authorized to issue permits to
companies that seek to dispose of solid waste. (R. 5). Their interests include an underlying policy of placing the State of Rocky
Mountain in the most profitable situation. It is within their best
interest to issue as many permits as feasible, as it will bring businesses to the State of Rocky Mountain, which in return will bring
money to the state. Their economic concern for the state is substantially different from FOL's interest in protecting natural
resources.
FOL could not be virtually represented by RMDENR in the
consent decree because RMDENR did not address any of the substantive issues that FOL seeks review over in this Court. FOL
has a legal right to move forward with their action and seek relief
due to the malfeasance of MMC, as such relief was not granted or
even considered in the administrative order.
It is arguable that privity is not dependent upon the subjective interests of the individual parties alone, but is satisfied when
27
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the two parties in question represent the same legal right. Harmon Industries,Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894, 903 ( 8 th Cir. 1999)
(citing Hickman v. Electronic Keyboarding, Inc., 741 F.2d 230 (8'
Cir. 1984)). In applying this heightened standard to the case at
bar, FOL remains separate and distinct from RMDENR and is not
2
in privity with the state agency.
FOL and RMDENR did not represent the same legal right.
RMDENR was authorized to issue administrative orders to persons who violate the Rocky Mountain Solid Waste Act. (R. 5).
They have a legal right under this act to enforce against those who
dispose of overburden waste in a landfill without a permit. In contrast, FOL's legal right stems from the citizen suit provision in
§ 1365 of the CWA, which allows them to file suit for MMC's violation of § 131 1(a) which prohibits the "discharge of any pollutant by
any person." They also seek sanctions against MMC because they
discharged pollutants without a mandatory permit issued under
either §§ 1342 or 1344 of the CWA. RMDENR's legal right comes
from state law, while FOL's legal right stems from federal law
under the CWA. Thus, they do not represent the same legal right
and FOL is not precluded from bringing this action.
B.

A consent decree does not invoke the application of
the res judicata doctrine as it is not a final
judgment rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction.

The application of res judicata is not warranted in the instant
case since there has not been a final adjudication by a court of law.
In August of 1994, rather than seeking judicial review of MMC's
violations, RMDENR chose to negotiate with MMC, thereafter issuing a consent administrative order under RMSWA. (R. 4). In
Annaco, Inc. v. Hodel, 675 F. Supp. 1052, 1058 (E.D. Ky. 1987),
the court recognized that a settlement agreement was an administrative action, rather than a final judgment, and thus, res judicata
did not preclude a suit on the matter. The settlement agreement
was not achieved through a decision by an impartial judge, rather
2. The EPA in Harmon was seeking an enforcement action based on the exact
same issue that the state agency had already addressed in their judicially approved
consent decree. Thus, the two parties were representing the same legal right, which
was to cease the companies' waste disposal and require them to comply with RCRA
regulations. The EPA authorized the state agency to administer and enforce a hazardous waste program pursuant to RCRA. Harmon,191 F.3d at 897. By giving states
this authorization, the federal agency relinquished its legal right to administer and
enforce hazardous waste programs among the states.
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it was achieved through discussion of the two parties. Therefore
the issues did not receive a full and fair litigation and are not
barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The court distinguishes the
agency settlement in Annaco from a State Supreme Court decision
in U.S. v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 627 F.2d at 1003 ( 9 th Cir. 1980). See
also Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (a consent decree between one group of employees and their employer cannot possibly
settle the conflicting claims of another group of employees who do
not join in the agreement).
RMDENR's and MMC's consent decree is not a final judgment
on the merits as is required to preclude a suit on the basis of the
doctrine of res judicata. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. at
153. The consent order was entered into pursuant to negotiations
between RMDENR and MMC. An impartial judge did not hear
arguments of fact and law from RMDENR and MMC and thus a
final judgment was not rendered on the merits of the case.
FOL was denied the right to intervene in the negotiations of
the parties as they would have been able to in litigation under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 24. The court in Martin noted that it is easier to
settle claims among a disparate group of affected persons if they
are all before the court, which joinder and mandatory intervention
would accomplish. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. at 768.
FOL would have been able to pursue its position vigorously if
there had been an adversarial proceeding. There was no opportunity for examination of witnesses and no opportunity for discovery. All aspects of the adjudicatory process that increase the
chances of rendering an equitable remedy were not present. It is
respectfully requested that because of the absence of a full and
fair litigation, there was not a final judgment on the merits and,
thus, the doctrine of res judicata does not preclude FOL from
bringing this suit.
C.

FOL did not receive proper notice and opportunity
for hearing comment on the administrative
proceeding therefore, FOL's citizen suit should
not be precluded.

Assuming arguendo that the consent decree is a final judgment as to invoke the doctrine of res judicata, precluding FOL
from bringing this suit would impinge on their fundamental right
to due process. FOL has a fundamental right to voice their interests about action that may adversely affect them. RMDENR and
MMC did not provide FOL with this opportunity. Instead they
29
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entered into an agreement without providing notice to anyone
about MMC's illegal action of discharging pollutants into Lustra
Creek. (R. 4). MMC was not sanctioned for this, but was ordered
to stop and correct the situation. (R. 4). However, the damage
was not corrected and RMDENR did nothing to insure the damage
was undone. (R. 4).
FOL was entitled by law to notice of RMDENR's intent to
compromise with MMC and of the proposed administrative consent order before issuance. Furthermore, they were entitled to a
public hearing on the issues posed in the administrative order.
Not only did RMDENR not give public notice of the intent or the
issuance of the consent order, but they also did not notify the public of the notice of violation they issued against MMC for the unpermitted landfill. (R. 4).
While FOL was not provided with notice of the proposed administrative order issued by RMDENR, they were likewise not
provided with the opportunity to voice their comments regarding
the agreement in a public hearing. FOL was not provided with
the opportunity to demonstrate why their interests of protecting
Lustra Creek should be considered in the administrative consent
order. Had RMDENR notified FOL of its intent to issue a consent
order to MMC, FOL would have been able to gather evidence for
presentation at a public hearing targeted to demonstrating that
the state agency should consider other important aspects related
to discharging pollutants in Lustra Creek and issue their administrative order accordingly.
The disposal of pollutants in Lustra Creek adversely affects
their objectives of protecting the environment and preserving natural resources. RMDENR prevented FOL from demonstrating
their interests in the consent order agreement between RMDENR
and MMC. Since FOL was not adequately represented in the Consent Order Agreement and was prevented from having ample notice and opportunity for hearings, it is respectfully suggested that
precluding FOL from bringing their citizen suit it is a violation of
procedural due process under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
FOL'S SUIT IS MOOT WHERE MMC FAILED
TO PROVE THAT THE VIOLATIONS WILL
NOT OCCUR AGAIN.

FOL's case is not moot because MMC's violations are continuing. (See Part II). Furthermore, it is substantially likely that
MMC will dispose of pollutants in Lustra Creek again. (See Part
II). If this Court fails to issue an injunctive order in this case,
MMC will most likely violate the CWA again and the disposal period will not be long enough to fully litigate and cease the detrimental harm that will result to Lustra Creek and the bodies of
water it flows into. Postponing this suit will only lead to an irreparable injustice where FOL and MMC would be subjected to the
same action for a second time.
Furthermore, if this Court upholds the lower court's decision
that the cessation by MMC was voluntary, MMC will be required
to prove that their wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur. United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629,
633-36; see, e.g., United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn.,
166 U.S. 290, (1897). (R. 9). MMC will not be able to overcome
this stringent standard because it is reasonably expected that
their previous violations will recur.
Additionally, assuming arguendo that the injunctive relief is
moot, the civil penalties sought are not. MMC participated in past
violation of permits under the CWA and therefore should be penalized accordingly.
A.

By applying the "capable of repetition, yet evading
review" exception, FOL's case is not moot.

The Supreme Court in Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482-83
(1982) requires two objectives to be met in order to satisfy the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception to mootness.
See also National Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't of
Envtl. Mgmt, 924 F.2d 1001, 1003 ( 1 1 th Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S.
1206. They are as follows:

31

376

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19

(1)

there be a reasonable expectation or a demonstrated
probability that the same controversy will recur
involving the same complaining party,

(2)

the challenged action is in its duration too short to be
fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration.

FOL meets both requirements and, thus, their civil suit
should not be rendered moot.
(1)

There is a reasonable expectation that MC will
dispose of pollutants in Lustra Creek again
and thus FOL will be forced to bring this
suit yet a second time.

MMC's previous wrongful conduct occurred three times when
they stripped the overburden and thereafter placed it in Lustra
Creek. (R. 4). Completion of the project requires a fourth, final
phase of removing overburden. (R. 4). If this Court does not issue
injunctive relief to FOL, it is reasonably certain that MMC will,
for the fourth time, place the overburden on top of Lustra Creek.
Not only is the placement of overburden in the Creek bed the easiest method, but it is also the cheapest. (R. 4). To date, they have
not secured landfill space to dispose of the overburden from the
fourth phase. (R. 4).
The administrative order issued by RMDENR did order MMC
to cease dumping waste overburden in the Creek landfill. In addition, it did not penalize MMC for disposing of the overburden, nor
did it contemplate future disposals. (R. 4). Additionally,
RMDENR ordered MMC to plant vegetation in the landfill and to
nurture the vegetation so that it is indistinguishable from those
on adjacent areas, yet RMDENR has not proceeded to force compliance with this order. (R. 4).
The record does not reflect that the consent administrative
order contemplated future violations. (R. 4). It did require MMC
to cease disposal immediately. (R. 4). However, the record further
reflects that MMC continued to violate the Consent Order after it
was issued. (R. 4). Since it is reasonably certain that MMC will
dispose of pollutants in Lustra Creek again, there is a demonstrated probability that the same controversy, as in the case sub
judice, will recur. MMC will again violate the CWA by dumping
pollutants in the Creek and FOL will be forced to file suit again
seeking injunctive relief ordering MMC to cease disposal.
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol19/iss1/10
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Furthermore, FOL seeks injunctive relief ordering MMC to
remove all overburden placed on the Creek bed. RMDENR has
not enforced compliance with their attempt to remedy the situation caused by MMC. (R. 4). Thus, FOL has an interest in forcing
MMC to return the Creek bed to the most natural state possible,
with the least harm. If this Court declares this case moot, it is
probable that MMC will continue non-compliance with the consent decree and the situation will only worsen. Thus, there is a
reasonable expectation that this same controversy will recur as
FOL will be forced to bring suit to protect further damage to the
Creek and to correct the damage that has already occurred.
(2)

The duration of MMC's removal of overburden
and subsequent disposal in Lustra Creek is too
short to be able to fully litigate prior to
cessation.

MMC removed and placed overburden in Lustra Creek intermittently between January 1980 and January 1998. (R. 4). The
overburden disposed of was divided into three separate segments.
(R. 4). Thus, three times during the period from 1980 to 1998,
MMC dumped pollutants into Lustra Creek. These disposals were
not made overnight, however, the exact length is undetermined.
(R. 9). Furthermore, because of the nature of the activity, to predict a specific period of time is not easily ascertainable. It could
depend on extrinsic circumstances, such as weather conditions,
amount of overburden on the fourth segment, and availability of
workers and equipment to dispose of the overburden.
While the duration remains undetermined, it is clear that the
disposal will not happen over night as appellee contends. However, it is also evident that the duration will be too short in order
to fully litigate on the problem before MMC ceases disposal. In
the instant case, the issues involved are quite complex and would
require a lengthy trial. Sierra Club v. Martin, 110 F.3d 1551 ( 1 1th
Cir. 1997) (a four month period for an injunction would not be sufficient time in order to fully litigate prior to the expiration, and
the litigation of the problem would be too lengthy and complex to
be able to litigate in such a short time). The number of possible
parties and complexity of the issues indicate that the duration of
the trial could be lengthy.
Consequently, the complete fourth phase of disposal could
take place before an injunction is rendered. It is not likely that
RMDENR will take immediate action, as MMC was able to dis33
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pose of pollutants in Lustra Creek for 18 years before RMDENR
decided to exercise its authority. The creek and surrounding area
will only be damaged further.
An injunction should be issued prior to the commencement of
the project because as soon as they begin dumping wastes, harm
to the environment begins. It is respectfully suggested, that this
Honorable Court take into consideration the nature of MMC's violation, and grant injunctive relief. It is not possible that final judicial resolution could be obtained before MMC completes their
disposal of the overburden.
B.

MMC's cessation was not voluntary, in the
alternative, if it was, FOL's case is not moot, as the
wrongful behavior is reasonably certain to recur.

It is well established that voluntary cessation of a challenged
practice does not moot the issue de facto. Friends of the Earth,
Inc. v. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167 (2000); City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's
Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289 (1982). If the federal court did not
contain its power to determine the legality of the practice, the defendant would be "free to return to his old ways." United States v.
W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953). Accordingly, the courts
have established a heightened standard, which requires the party
asserting mootness to prove that the allegedly wrongful behavior
could not reasonably be expected to recur. United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n, Inc., 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968).
The lower court failed to apply this heightened standard, rather
they held that because MMC ceased disposal voluntarily and the
"capable of review yet evading repetition" exception did not apply
FOL's suit was moot. (R. 9).
MMC certainly would not be able to overcome this heavy burden of proof, as they have not yet made disposal plans for the
fourth phase, their location is conducive to dumping in Lustra,
and it would be the cheapest and easiest means of disposing of the
wastes. (R. 4). Based on the foregoing, MMC would not be able to
prove that their wrongful conduct could not reasonably be expected to recur.
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If the court determines that FOL's claim for

injunctive relief is moot, their claim for civil
penalties is not moot because the violations are
"wholly past."
FOL seeks civil penalties against MMC. Under the CWA, civil
penalties attach as of the date a violation occurs. The statute
states, "Any person who violates any permit condition or limitation.., shall be subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $10,000 per
day of such violation." 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d). Thus, FOL's suit
seeking penalties is intrinsically incapable of being rendered moot
by MMC's cessation because civil penalties are based on past violations, which are present in the case sub judice. Consequently, if
this court finds that FOL's claim for injunctive relief is moot, this
does not warrant a finding that the claim for civil penalties is also
moot. See United States v. ITT Rayonier,Inc., 627 F.2d 996, 1000
( 9 th Cir. 1980) (when the EPA brings suit for injunctive relief and
civil penalties, an appeal is not mooted even if injunctive relief
becomes inappropriate); Atlantic States Legal Foundation,Inc. v.
Stroh Die Casting Co., 116 F.3d 814 ( 7 th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
118 S.Ct. 442 (civil penalties under the CWA may still be available
for past violations of permits).
FOL seeks civil penalties for every day the fill was placed or
allowed to remain in Lustra Creek. The overburden has remained
on the bed of the Creek since 1980, when they first began disposing in the area. (R. 4). These violations are the type of actions the
CWA seeks to punish so as to deter future harmful conduct. MMC
should be penalized for each day they remained in non-compliance
with the CWA. It is for these reasons that FOL's claim for civil
penalties is not moot.
CONCLUSION
It is for the foregoing reasons that FOL respectfully requests
that this Court: 1) find that the administrative order issued by
RMDENR was not sufficient diligent prosecution to preclude FOL
from bringing a citizen suit; 2) find that the continuing presence of
overburden in Lustra Creek is a continuing violation and that it is
substantially likely that they will violate the CWA again; 3) find
that FOL cannot be precluded by the doctrine of res judicata; and
4) find that a consent order issued by a state enforcement agency
is insufficient to render a citizen suit moot.
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